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1.

INTRODUCTION

This Article explores the role of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") as part of an emerging system of international governance. I focus on a set of inescapable linkages from the trade regime, to other policy issues and goals, such as environmental
protection. I further argue that the future success and effectiveness of the World Trade Organization depends not only on its
ability to effectively manage these linkages but also on its capacity
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to simultaneously absorb the lessons of welfare economics, competition theory, public choice analysis, federalism, and other analytic tools that underpin these linkages. I note, in particular, that
with a broader, more interdisciplinary understanding of its role,
the WTO' might come to see that its current hostility toward
non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") is misplaced and
harmful to the performance and public legitimacy of the international trading system.
2. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING

TRADE LINKAGES

The WTO has emerged as a central element of the world's international economic management structure. 2 This system, which
also includes the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
("IMF"), and a growing series of regional trade regimes, provides a
mechanism for addressing international economic interdependence and for promoting economic interactions that offers the
promise of maximizing social welfare across the planet. 3 International economic institutions have taken on a special importance in
the post-Cold War era as international relations have evolved beyond a narrow focus on politico-military affairs. "Security" today
involves a set of economic issues and other variables that combine
to reflect a general diminishment of the threat of war. 4 A number
1 This phrase suggests a personification of the WTO that refers to the par-

ticipants in the international trading system, including the staff of the WTO
andthe national representatives that guide the organization. A prior article
based on the same conference has been previously published. See Daniel C.
Esty, Non-Governmental Organizationsat the World Trade Organization:Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. OF INT'L ECON. L. 123 (1998)
[hereinafter Esty, NGOs].
2 See PITOU VAN DIJCK & GERRIT F. FABER, CHALLENGES TO THE NEW
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 24 (1996); see also THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AHEAD (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1996) (presenting a collection of papers from the June 1996 Conference on World Trade Policy that focuses on new issues facing the WTO); John Jackson, Reflections on Constitutional Changes to the Global Trading System, 72 CHI. KENT L. REV. 511, 519-20
(1996) [hereinafter Jackson, Reflections] (relating the WTO to international
economic regulation and GATT).
3 For discussions of the global trade system, see ROBERT GILPIN, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 171 (1987); JOHN H.
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1994); JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF ECONOMIC
RELATIONS (2d ed. 1997); Jackson, Reflections, supra note 2, at 512-15.
Daniel C. Esty, Pivotal States and the Environment, in UNITED STATES
STRATEGY AND THE PIVOTAL STATES: TESTING AN INTELLECTUAL HY-
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of academic disciplines can provide theoretical guidance in determining the type of governance structure needed to manage international economic relations.
2.1.
Welfare Economics
The triumph of market economics is now apparent around
the world. Economists, however, have long understood that economic systems do not operate efficiently without regulatory5
structures to prevent externalities and other market failures.
Market failure will occur without mechanisms to internalize externalities, such as pollution, and the use of "collective action" to
manage common resources. This failure will reduce the allocative
efficiency of the economic system and result in reduced social
welfare, environmental degradation, and over-exploitation of
shared resources. 6 Thus, for the WTO to realize the potential
benefits of trade and investment liberalization, it must find ways
to ensure that market failures do not plague international economic relations.

POTHESIS (Paul Kennedy et al. eds., 1998). For discussions of the changing
definition of "security", see Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF.,
Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 50-51; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Redefining Security,
FOREIGN AFF., Spr. 1989, at 162; Norman Myers, Environment and Security,
FOREIGN POL'Y, Spr. 1989, at 23; Richard H. Ullman, Redefining Security,
INT'L SECURITY, Summer 1983, at 129.
5 See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1978) (presenting a theoretical analysis of the
interaction between economics and the environment); ANDRt DUA & DANIEL
C. ESTY, SUSTAINING THE ASIA PACIFIC MIRACLE: ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1997).
6 See generallyDUA & ESTY, supra note 5 (explaining how and why
market
failures cause environmental harm and economic inefficiency which result in
welfare losses). See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 28 (1965) (discussing
the "tendency of small groups towards a suboptimal provision of collective
goods"); Garrett Hardin, The-Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244-45
1968 discussing
the 'Tragedy
of Commerce
Freedom inand
a Commons");
Carol
Rose, The
Comedy
of the Commons:
Custom,
Iherently Public
Property,
53
proppublic
of
conundrum
the
(discussing
(1986)
U. CHI.L. REV. 711, 711-13
erty in a society that values exclusive property rights); Gordon TullockFede alism:Problems of Scale, 6 PUB. CHOICE 19, 25-28 (1969) (discussing the optimal
size of government to internalize externalities).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa.J. Int'l Econ. L.

2.2.

[Vol 19:3

RegulatoryFederalism

The growing literature on regulatory federalism reinforces the
suggestion that the WTO, as the centerpiece of the international
economic management structure, must play a regulatory role and
contain economic interactions with rules designed to prevent
market failure. The American work on federalism 7 and the
European Union's work on subsidiarity8 suggest that to be effective, regulatory intervention must occur on a scale commensurate
with the scope of either the externality to be addressed, the public
good to be provided, or the open access resource to be managed.
The fact that certain environmental issues and regulatory
questions are global in scale requires that some international body
play a leadership role. While other institutions, such as the
World Bank or an as-yet-not-created Global Environmental Organization, could carry the burden of regulating and generating
the requisite collective action, there is no presently existing body
as well positioned as the WTO to ensure that market failures do
not plague the global economy. Moreover, international environmental problems and challenges relating to the management of
the global commons, such as the looming threat of climate change
due to greenhouse gas emissions, the challenge of protecting the
biological diversity of the planet, the depletion of fisheries across
the seven seas, and trans-boundary spillovers of acid rain, continue to grow on a daily basis.

See generally Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalitiesand the
Matching Principle: The Casefor ReallocatingEnvironmentalRegulatory Authority, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 23 (1996) (advocating for a decentralized approach to
environmental regulation); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing EnvironmentalFederalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996) [hereinafter Esty, Revitalizing] (arguing for
centralized environmental regulation); Richard B. Stewart, InternationalTrade
and Environment:Lessonsfrom the FederalExperience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1329 (1992) (providing an analytical structure on issues of law and policy presented by trade-related environmental regulation).
8 For discussions of subsidiarity, see George A. Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994); Denis J. Edwards,FearingFederalism'sFailure:Subsidiarity in the European Union, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 537 (1996); Paul D. Marquardt, Subsidiarityand Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 616 (1994); Joel P. Trachtman, L'Etat C"est Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration and Subsidiarity, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 459 (1992); W. Gary Vause, The
SubsidiarityPrinciple in European Union Law-American Federalism Compared,
27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 61 (1995).
7
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Regulatory Failure

While market failures are pervasive, so too are regulatory failures. Government intervention to prevent market failure can be
unsuccessful for many reasons.9 "Structural failures" arise when
issues are dealt with on the wrong geographic scale.10 Given the
weakness of the global governance structures, intervention on a
scale sufficient to internalize global-scale externalities poses special
difficulties." Regulatory effectiveness and efficiency also require
basic scientific and technical competence and a capacity to overcome public choice failures.1 2 Regulatory failures can be found at
every level of government, but are especially common at the international level. 13 Since the WTO cannot avoid playing a regulatory role, it must find ways to strengthen its performance to
avoid widespread failure while in its regulatory mode.
3. THE CHALLENGE OF "TRADE AND" DECISION-MAKING AT
THE WTO

The keepers of the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") have done much. to promote improved social welfare
9 See generally J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION
CONTROL IN THE UNITED

STATES:

EVALUATING

THE

SYSTEM

(1998)

(evaluating and analyzing government pollution policy with the goal of preserving successful environmental policy and reforming the failures); MARK
LANDRY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE
WRONG QUESTIONS FROM NIXON TO CLINTON (1994) (seeking "to uncover

the mistaken premises that have clouded and distorted debate about environmental policy and have led the EPA to make some poor policy decisions");
Esty, Revitalizing,supra note 7, at 577-99 (arguing that unclear property rights
within the environmental arena cause market failures in this area).
10 Esty, Revitalizing, supra note 7, at 587-97 explaining why regulation at
the "wrong" level of government causes "structur"failure).
For discussions of structural mismatch, see generally John B. Braden,The
Economics of EnvironmentalPolicy-making in a Multi-layer Government Structure, in RECENT ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Filip Abraham et al. eds., 1995) (considering "the
allocation of regulatory powers over environmental protection between local
and central governments"); Esty, Revitalizing, supra note 7, at 587-99 (noting
the difficulty of taking into account all the positive and negative externalities of
a given
environment regulation).
12
See Esty, Revitalizing, supra note 7, at 585-87 (noting that technical welfare losses may arise from miscalculations of environmental risks and administrative costs).
13 See VAN DIJCK & FARBER, supra note 2; Jackson, Reflections, supra note
2, at 512-14 (examining when governments should regulate in the context of
market failure).
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U. Pa.J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol 19:3

through trade liberalization. 14 Through successive rounds of
trade negotiations, the international trading system has reduced
tariffs, established widely followed principles for economic inter5
action, and created a well functioning dispute resolution system.1
Unfortunately, the WTO, like the GATT before it, has performed less effectively in dealing with "trade and" issues such as
environmentally-related trade disputes. Beyond the narrow trade
realm, the WTO's authority is often questioned. The organization lacks the capacity to make decisions on environmental issues
and other non-trade subjects when dealing with problems that require expertise. 16 As stated, the ideal international governance
structure would not force the WTO to make environmental decisions or other regulatory judgments outside its zone of established
competence. Such tasks are better left to a Global Environmental
Organization.' 7 The prospect, however, of a functioning international environmental management structure emerging in the near
future is bleak. The WTO, by default, must play a regulatory
14 See JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 3, at
7 ("[T]he
liberalization of trade and financial flows promoted by this postwar system,
sometimes broadly called the Bretton Woods System, had progressed far
enough to foster an unprecedented surge of trade and to demonstrate the economic benefits that flow from such liberalization.");see also Barry Eichengreen
& Peter B. Kenen, Managing the World Economy under the Bretton Woods System: An Overview, in MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY: FIFTY YEARS
AFTER BRETTON WOODS, 3-7, 21-27 (Kenen, ed. 1994).
15 See VAN DijCK & FABER, supra note 2, at 24; JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 3; Jackson, Reflections, supra note 2, at 519-20
(discussing the current structure of the WTO); cf Jeffrey Dunoff, Institutional
Misfits: The GA TT, The IC]and Trade-EnvironmentDisputes, 15MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1043, 1063-66 [hereinafter Dunoff, Misfits] (criticizing GATT dispute resolution).
16

See DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE,
ENVIRONMENT,

AND THE FuTURE 115 (1994) [hereinafter ESTY, GREENING THE GATT] (noting
that environmentalists question GATT's policy of making environmental
judgments); Dunoff, Misfits, supra note 15, at 1063-65 (stating that in
trade/environment conflicts, the dispute resolution process is biased against environmental interests); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade And: Recent Developments in
Trade Policy andScholarship-andTheir SurprisingPoliticalImplications, 17NW.
J. INT'L L. & BUS. 759, 763 (1996-97) [hereinafter Dunoff, "Trade And]
(arguing that GATT is not equipped to review national environmental priorities).
i7 See ESTY, GREENING THE GATT, supra note 16, at 73-98 arguing for a
Global Environmental Organization); see also Daniel C. Esty, The Case for a
Global Environmental Organization, in MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY:
FIFTY YEARS AFTER BRETTON WOODS 287 (Peter B. Kenen ed., 1994)
[hereinafter Esty, The Case] (arguing the same).
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role in the environmental realm and perhaps in other areas as
well.
The WTO faces a further challenge to its ability to fairly and
openly make regulatory judgments. Few outside the world of
trade experts understand how the WTO operates. This lack of
public understanding is exacerbated by the WTO's closed nature.1 8 Because the procedures of the international trading system, particularly dispute resolution activities, are not transparent,
many outside observers suspect that the process is potentially biased in favor of producer interests and trade principles. The
WTO thus faces challenges both to the procedural fairness of its
activities and to the substantive fairness of its decisions.
All international bodies with governance responsibilities face
an additional challenge. This challenge is related to their perceived lack of representation of and responsiveness to the communities around the world that must live with their decisions.
Political science literature views decisions made at a great distance
from ordinary citizens as creating a "democratic deficit." 9 As the
WTO takes a larger and more visible role as an international decision-making body, its representativeness will be increasingly scrutinized.
In sum, the legitimacy of the WTO as an international entity
is questionable. In the United States, few question Congress'
authority to make regulatory decisions or the courts' ability to interpret those rules in actual cases. 20 Parallel efforts by the WTO
to set forth rules for international economic interaction and to interpret such principles through dispute resolution procedures
See ESTY, GREENING THE GATT, supra note 16, at 35-36 (describing the
claims of special interest groups that the GATT and NAFTA are secretive and
harmful deas); Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 128 (describing the public misperception that the WTO is secretive in nature); Ralph Nader,Free Trade and the
Decline of Democracy, in THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE: GATT, NAFTA,
18

AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POWER (1993).

19 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Committee on the Regions and the Role of Regional Governments in the European Union, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 413, 420 (1997) (discussing the emergence of and desire to remedy a democratic deficit in the EU); see generally SoI Picciotto, Networks in International
Economic Integration:FragmentedStates and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1014, 1038 (1996-97) (describing how"democratic deficit" undercuts the effectiveness of a global network).
20 See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 127 n.18 (noting that the U.S. Supreme
Court is rarely criticized for making trade and environment decisions despite
the fact that it has no more knowledge on those subjects than the WTO, which
is often criticized for deciding such matters).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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have led to firestorms of protest. 2' The WTO cannot perform its
coordinating role under these conditions.
4. NGOs AND WTO LEGITIMACY

Most officials within the international trading system, both
those who are part of the WTO Secretariat and those in Geneva
who represent national interests, believe that greater participation
by NGOs in the work of the WTO would harm the international
trading system. 22 There are, however, important reasons to believe that a more open WTO process, which would include
greater participation by a wider range of groups, would enhance
the effectiveness and legitimacy of the WTO. Specifically, NGOs
might sharpen WTO regulatory performance by providing competition to the government officials that currently carry out these
responsibilities. 3 Additionally, NGOs could help address the
representation issues raised when decisions made in Geneva have
global effects.2 4
4.1.

NGOs' Cooperationwith the W/TO

Decision-making by the WTO, in interpreting the rules of international trade, is both inevitable and essential. As noted above,
21 The recent furor in the United States over the shrimp-turtle decision follows prior distress generated by the infamous tuna-dolphin dispute and other
"trade and environment" cases. See, e.g., Trade: WTO Shrimp-Tu;tle Ruling Will
Not Halt U.S. ProtectionEfforts, Barshefsky Vows, 68 DAILY ENVTL. REP. (BNA)
at A-4 (Apr. 9, 1998) (reporting U.S. Trade Representative Barshefsky's reaction
to an adverse WTO ruling); David Vogel, Reconciling Free Trade with Responsible Regulation, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Fall 1995, at 73, 76-78 (discussing the tunadolphin dispute).
For examples of the argument against broader participation of NGOs,
see Jagdish Bhagwati & T.N. Srinivasan, Trade and the Environment:Does EnvironmentalDiversity Detractfrom the Casefor Free Trade?, in FAIR TRADE AND
HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 159, 195-96 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Robert Hudec eds., 1996) [hereinafter Bhagwati & Srinivasan];
Philip M. Nichols, Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 851, 851-72 (1996) (expressing concerns about
expanding the role of NGOs in WTO dispute settlement panels). Cf William
M. Reichert, Note, Resolving the Trade and Environment Conflict: The WTO
and NGO Consultative Relations, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 219, 237-243
(1996) (arguing in favor of consultative relations between NGOs and the

WTO).

See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 135-37 (arguing that the public would be
better served if NGOs became more involved in WTO decisions .
24 For discussions of representation issues, see id. at 128.
23
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the results of the WTO's trade liberalization efforts will be diminished if it fails to address issues such as the threat of environmental externalities. Nevertheless, WTO decisions inescapably
raise questions about loss of sovereignty and a lack of democracy.
The organization can develop links to dispersed citizens around
the world in whose interests it carries out trade liberalization efforts by involving NGOs more formally in the operation of the
WTO. NGOs, often more successfully than governments, maintain relationships with individual citizens who care about various
issues that may be under consideration either directly or indirectly within the WTO.2 5 Individuals, for example, who care
about the protection of endangered species are far more likely to
get information about the impact of trade on endangered species
through
the World26Wildlife Fund than through their own na•
tional governments. It makes sense for World Wildlife Fund officials to be included in WTO discussions that might concern the
preservation of species.
World Wildlife Fund officials who monitor events at the
WTO would then be able to report back to their members
around the world about the activities occurring in Geneva. If
trusted NGO sources produce regular reports explaining WTO
operations, the public will come to better understand how the
WTO works and makes decisions.2 7 Environmental activists may
still disapprove of some outcomes, but the sense of arbitrariness
and obscurity currently attached to WTO decisions might partially abate.
A further step toward addressing the WTO's democratic deficit would be taken if NGO representatives at the WTO were allowed to go beyond observation of the discussions taking place in
Geneva and were permitted to make submissions representing
their views. 28 Hearing NGO views in the context of dispute resoSee Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 131-32 (describing the shortcomings of
government representation of public interests).
26 See i. at 132.
25

27 Cf Ann Marie Clark, Non-Governmental Organizationsand Their Influence on InternationalSociety, 48 J. INT'L AFF. 507, 518-21 (1995) (describing the
role NGOs can play in providing for the public exchange of information); Esty,
NGOs, supra note 1, at 134 (describing the role NGOs can play in sharing information about the WTO with the public); Paul Ghils,InternationalCivilSociety: InternationalNon-Governmental Organizationsin the InternationalSystem,
44 INT'L. SOC. SC. J. 417 (1992).
28 For a discussion of the NGOs' ability to represent transnational interests, see PAUL WAPNER, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM AND WORLD CIVIC
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lution efforts or general governing council discussions poses little
threat to the deliberations of these bodies and would offer the potential for better informed decision-making. 29 Indeed, when
"trade and" issues are being addressed, it is clear that outside per30
spectives would enhance WTO deliberations.
Not only do NGOs offer specific substantive area expertise
that cannot possibly be found within the small Secretariat of the
WTO, but non-governmental entities also represent, in a way that
31
governments cannot, the richness and diversity of civil society.
While traditional international relations theory focuses on stateto-state relations, more modern learning about international affairs 32
highlights the more complex set of actors on the global
stage. A more inclusive approach to environmental groups and
other NGOs would allow the WTO to hear voices that it might
otherwise miss if it limits discussions to those in official capacities.
The opportunity to strengthen the substantive foundation for
WTO decision-making is clear. In addition, the opportunity to
fold NGO perspectives into the WTO would help to broaden the
POLITICS (1995) (describing four different NGOs and their international in-

volvement). See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 131 (arguing that NGO participation would allow minority voices to be heard);seealso, Wendy Schoener, Note,
Non-governmental Organizationsand Global Activism: Legal and Informal Approaches,4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 537, 564-66 (1997) (describing NGOs'
contribution to an Argentine human rights organization).
29 See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 143-47 (describing the benefits of NGO
participation in WTO activities).
30 See ESTY, GREENING THE GATT, supra note 16, at 115-16 (describing
how the GATT might benefit in environmental issues by seeking environmental experts); Dunoff, Misfits, su ra note 15, at 1063-66 (discussing GATT's
closed decision-making process and its lack of environmental expertise); Dunoff, "Trade And," supra note 16, at 763-64 (questioning WTO expertise as it expands into new substantive areas).
31 See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 132; see also Barbara J. Bramble & Gareth Porter, Non-Governmental Organizations and the Making of US International Environmental Policy, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 313, 315-322 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury eds:,
1992) (providing an example of the diversity in characteristics of different environmental
NGOs).
32
..
For discussions of the evolving conceptions of states' roles, seeMARVIN
S. SOROOS, BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL POLICY 75-

119 (1986) (describing the actors and the roles they play in shaping global policy). See generally STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (Thomas J.
Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996) (providing different examples of state
sovereignty); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?,
106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2604-41 (1997) (describing the evolution of international
law).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss3/1
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base of the organization's decision-making structure. 3 Indeed,
the presence of NGO perspectives would help to mitigate the
public choice distortions that might otherwise arise because some
of the national representatives in Geneva are sent by governments
that are not fully democratic.14 Moreover, the presence of NGO
representatives permits the intensity of public preferences to be
registered
in a way that national government representation can35
not.
An expanded role for NGOs, particularly environmental
groups, in the workings of the international trading system,
would not only address public choice problems that might otherwise diminish the legitimacy of WTO decision-making, but
would offer the prospect of broader political support for trade
and investment liberalization. Specifically, the coalition in support of freer trade is often narrow, especially in the United States.
Prospects for trade liberalization may be strengthened by ensuring that environmentalists feel comfortable within the pro-freetrade camp. Also, since the environmental community represents
a critical swing constituency in trade debates, 36 from the perspective of political economy, it is logical to try and make them feel
welcome in the pro-free trade camp.

33 See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 132-33.
34 See id.; see also ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN,
FUNCTIONS

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL

PROBLEMS

OF

CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC LAW 166-67 (1991) (describing how a lack of public discussion al-

lows for the circumvention of "grey area trade restrictions").
35 For a discussion of how public preference can be undermined, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
63, 75 (1990).
36 A number of environmental NGOs supported NAFTA after their inclusion in the negotiation process. See JOHN J. AUDLEY, GREEN POLITICS AND
GLOBAL TRADE: NAFTA AND THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 6492 (1997) (discussing the ability of environmental groups to have a formalized
role in trade policy by posing a credible threat to NAFTA's success); ESTY,
GREENING THE GATT, supra note 16, at 27-28 (discussing the critical role of
environmental NGOs in the NAFTA negotiations); Frederick M. Abbott,

Foundation-Buildingfor Western Hemispheric Integration, 17Nw. J. INT'L L. &

BUS. 900, 924-26 (1996-7); Daniel C. Esty, Environmentalists and Trade Policy-

making, in REPRESENTATION OF CONSTITUENT INTERESTS IN THE DESIGN

AND IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. TRADE POLICY (Alan V. Deardorff & Robert

M. Stern eds., 1998).
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NGOs as Competitionat the WTO

An expanded role for NGOs at the WTO would not only
provide the "connective tissue" that could bring WTO decisionmakers into closer contact with their public, but it might also
provide intellectual competition that would improve the effectiveness of the WTO as a regulatory body. 7 The need for intellectual competition is especially acute in the environmental domain. Environmental decision-making is marked by uncertainty,
technical complexity, and the dynamic nature of the natural environment. Good environmental policy-making requires that the
prevailing wisdom be constantly re-examined. In this respect,
multiple perspectives provide an opportunity to triangulate on
the truth. Given the difficulty of identifying optimal environmental policies, it is useful to have competing entities trying to
develop better policy analysis, strategies, and tools. This competition is likely to improve decision-making and to make environmental policy-making more efficient.3 9
I argue for a new type of "regulatory competition." Relying
on horizontally-arrayed governments to compete with each other
in the environmental policy domain offers very limited prospects
for innovation or efficiency.4 0 I believe that non-government entities are better positioned to play the role of intellectual competi-

37 See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 135-37 (discussing the benefits of compe-

tition to WTO decision-making).
38 See generally Esty, Revitalizing, supra note 7, at 578-80 (presenting a discussion of the many technical dimensions of environmental policy-making and
thus the value of having multiple policy efforts existing simultaneously).
39 See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 135-37 (referring to the
benefits of competition in WTO decision-making).
For discussions of "traditional" regulatory competition, see William A.
Fischel, FiscalandEnvironmental Considerationsin the Location of Firms in Sub-

urban Communities, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 119

(Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975) (commenting on this phenomenon as it applies to land use); Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. SchwabEconomic
CompetitionAmong Jurisdictions:Efficiency Enhancing orDistortionInducing, 35
. PUB. ECON. 334 (1988) (describing competition among jurisdictions for mobile capital); Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental-Regulation:A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 538-40 (1997)
(discussing interstate and-federal competition in economic regulation); Charles
M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)
(discussing the problems presented by federal and local government expenditures on public goods).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss3/1
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tors. 41 By bringing to bear competing data, information, theoretical assumptions, divergent perspectives on the current environmental reality, and alternative approaches to addressing problems,
NGOs force government officials to reassess and justify their own
policy choices. NGOs are well established as environmental policy competitors in the national realm, at least in the United
States. 42 Bringing the same competitive pressures to bear internationally promises to yield real dividends.
Intellectual competition is likely to be particularly helpful
when the WTO is asked to deal with "trade and" issues in which
its own expertise is limited. The WTO staff is made up of trade
experts, oriented toward the promotion of trade liberalization and
having a world view shaped by the principles of orthodox economics. This shared sense of purpose and 43
intellectual underpinculture.
trade-focused
powerful
a
create
ning
One might imagine that national governments could bring
competing analyses to bear at the WTO. Most of the government
officials assigned to the WTO, however, also have trade backgrounds, and share the assumptions and training that mark the
WTO staff.44 NGOs, on the other hand, bring a more diverse set
of assumptions and theoretical approaches to the questions facing
the WTO. In addition, NGOs are often more nimble and entrepreneurial than government officials, allowing them to move

41

See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 136 (comparing NGOs and govern-

ments as intellectual competitors).
42 See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 136; see also Elizabeth Dowdeswell &
Steve Charnovitz, Globalization, Trade, and Interdependence, in THINKING
ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 91,

99 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997) (describing possible future
roles for NGOs in developing environmental policy); Dunoff," Trade And," supra note 16, at 763-64 (raising questions of the WTO's ability to deal with environmental issues).
4 For discussions of the liabilities implicated by the WTO's moving
beyond trade issues, see GATT Report by the Chairman of the Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade presented to the Contracting Parties at the Forty-Ninth Session, GATT B.I.S.D. (40th Supp.) at 75 (1992-3);
Dunoff, Misfits, supra note 16, at 1063-66; Dunoff, "Trade A-nd," supra note 16,
at 762-64.
44 See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 136 (discussing the narrow"trade" perspective of both WTO staff and the national government officials who are assigned to this body).
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quickl4 to bring new thinking to the fore, and to re-shape debates.
In addition to the "horizontal" policy competition that would
be engendered by giving NGOs a broader role at the WTO, the
organization would also benefit from a greater degree of "vertical"
competition. Specifically, global decision-making should be both
infused with and challenged by the best thinking from national
decision processes and lower levels of government. When issues
are played out across multiple levels of government, the prospect
that "wrong" answers will be agreed upon and persist over time is
reduced. The competing levels of government act as a system of
checks and balances.4 1 In this regard, richer "WTO politics"
would not only improve WTO decision-making, but would also
help to compensate for inadequate national trade policy debates
and weak national trade policy-making.
5. NGOs AS SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS
The argument against giving non-governmental organizations
a broader role in the decision-making processes of the WTO usually focuses on the risk that these groups will act as narrow special
interest groups and manipulate the policy outcomes of the
WTO. 47 Such fears are exaggerated.48
' See id. at 136-37 (comparing NGOs to governments as intellectual competitors and idea generators).
46 See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787),in 5
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 17, at 23 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904); Akhil
Reed Amar, A Neo-FederalistView ofArticle II. Separatingthe Two Tiers of FederalJurisdiction,65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 247 n.134 (1985) (stating that the Federalist enterprise was conceived of as a way to "erect a strong bulwark of individual
rights" against overbearing state governments); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1444-51 (1987) (discussing Federalism
and vertical divisions of power); Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 137 (discussing
the benefits of horizontal and vertical competitioi).
47 See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to NongovernmentParties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 295, 318-20
(1996) [hereinafter Nichols, Extension]; Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates:
Nongovernmental Organizations and the "Unregulated" Marketplace, 18
CARDOZO L. REv. 957, 963 (1996) (discussing alternative marketplace regulators in light of the decline of state control).
48 See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 139 (stating that the fears of NGOs'
manifestations at the WTO are overblown since many other special interests
already are present at the WTO); but see Arvind Subramanian, Trade Measures
for Environment: A Nearly Empty Box?, 15 WORLD ECONOMY 135 (1992)
(suggesting that the trade system is at constant risk of "capture" by special interests, including environmental groups).
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The threat of special-interest driven policy distortions does
not arise equally across all of the roles that NGOs might play at
the WTO. Notably, allowing NGOs to observe WTO processes,
including Council meetings and dispute resolution proceedings,
offers the potential for significant benefits at little risk. 49 Permitting NGOs to watch and report on WTO activities would improve the public's understanding of the international trading system and reduce the obscurity of WTO decision-making.50 The
fact that NGOs witness trade issue debates is not likely to create
any risk of special interest manipulation within the WTO. There
is some risk that NGOs, with more knowledge of how a particular WTO decision process is unfolding, will go to their national
governments and exert pressure to affect the outcome. In many
respects, such lobbying at the national level already takes place,
though only by a subset of the special interest community
(producer interests)5 1who happen to have inside information about
WTO proceedings.
The issue of whether NGOs should be allowed to participate
in WTO activities raises harder questions, but I do not think the
risks tip the balance toward exclusion. Allowing NGOs to make
submissions to dispute resolution panels, for example, would
likely help inform the decision-making process and minimize the
risk that the decision-makers would be unduly influenced. Similarly, allowing NGOs to present their views during Council debates would only sway decision-makers if the arguments were
thoughtful and well-informed.
Some WTO observers suggest that more open procedures
would make it more difficult for governments to intentionally
lose a case where domestic political pressures are forcing them to
advance a protectionist point of view. This, however, cannot
49 See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 14445 (outlining arguments for NGO

observation of the WTO).
'0 For a discussion of the importance of transparency, see J. OlokaOnyango, Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigoratingthe Strugglefor Economic and Social Rights in Africa, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1995) (discussing economic and
human rights on the African continent).
51 See Nichols, Extension, supra note 47, at 319-20 (pointing out that
the
buffer between makers of trade policy and special interest groups allows cooperation among governments without the intrusion of special interest groups);
Nichols, Realism, supra note 22, at 860 (suggestingthat the fact that NGOs do
not appear before dispute panels acts as a buffer between decision makers and
specific interest groups); Petersmann, supra note 34 (describing how users of
"grey area trade policies" circumvent open and informed public discussion).
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serve as a defense for keeping NGOs and the broader public in
the dark about WTO activities. Indeed, obscurity in decisionmaking almost always produces more severe public choice distortions than transparent processes where
the relevant assumptions
52
see.
to
all
for
available
are
and views
Some of the resistance to allowing environmental groups into
the WTO clearly arises from a fear that most NGOs are protectionist by nature."3 Yet while some environmental groups do not
54
seriously view free trade as a policy goal, many others do.
There are already a great number of protectionist interests that
operate within the walls of the WTO, representing a variety of
producer interests. Environmental groups might therefore represent a countervailing force that would actually promote free
trade.
Other WTO observers argue that the increased presence and
participation of NGOs in the WTO would disrupt the operations
of the organization as an intergovernmental body. Specifically,
Nichols argues that the presence of NGOs might lead to confusion as to who is speaking for whom.5 6 This argument carries little weight. If a French environmental group offers a particular
view, does this imply that the French government backs the opinion presented? Decision-makers at the national level learned long
ago to sort out the perspectives advanced by various interest
groups.17 Likewise, fears that environmentalists would not be
held accountable for the positions they advance are fundamentally
overblown. Groups that make inaccurate, irresponsible, or foolish statements will find their credibility rapidly eroded. NGOs
52 See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 140 (describing the benefits of transparent decision-making processes).
See id. at 139 (describing free traders' fears); Reichert, supra note 22, at
220-21 (discussing the "divergent perspectives" of environmentalists and free
trade advocates).
54 The NAFTA negotiations exemplify this. See ESTY, GREENING THE
GATT, supra note 16, at 28 (addressing the role of environmentalists in the
NAFTA debates); Esty, Environmentalistsand Trade Policy-makingsupranote
36; see also Audley, supra note 36, at 35 (indicating that certain environmental
groups are more receptive to trade issues).
5 See generally Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 138 (describing trade officials
balancing between specialized interests and general public interests).
56 See Nichols, Extension, supra note 47, at 316-18 (describing how extending standing to NGOs could create uncertainty about a country's position in
dispute settlements).
57 See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 142.
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that offer thoughtful perspectives will enhance their reputations
and be looked to more regularly and with greater seriousness
through time.
Another source of concern about allowing NGOs into the
WTO decision-making process is that it gives them "two bites at
the apple."58 Specifically, NGOs may shape national decisionmaking processes and, if they are unhappy with the outcome at
that level, they can then go to the WTO and attempt to obtain
another outcome. This tension between national and international decision-making processes is, however, a good thing. Some
governmental decisions are made without regard to important positions that might have been considered but for public choice deficiencies in the national decision-making process.5 9 Moreover,
some debates are best conducted at the international level where
the full spectrum of the views that might inform the outcome of
those debates can be aired.60
Other observers argue that a greater role for NGOs at the
WTO might exacerbate the existing bias toward Northern viewpoints and further weaken the voice of those advancing the needs
of the developing world.6 ' While perhaps more "Northern" environmental groups would be able to afford a presence in Geneva
than groups from developing countries, the "Northern" representatives would not necessarily speak with a united "developed"
country perspective. 62 Moreover, the advantage of a physical
58

Id. at 140.

59 See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 35, at 75 (discussing one person,
one choice).
60 See generally Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 141 n.77 (referring to NGOs
such as Amnesty International and the World Wildlife Fund which are international in scope); Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss,PluralizingGlobal Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions, in NGOS, THE UN AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 17, 27-28 (Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds.,
1996) [hereinafter Gordenker & Weiss] ("A main function of formal coalitions
of NGOs is to develop as far as possible or to harmonise [sic] common positions for issues."); Michael H. Posner & Candy Whittome, The Status o/Human
Rights NGOs, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 269, 270-72 (1994) (indicating
that NGOs "have helped to transform the debate from a restrained diplomatic
discourse
among governments to a more urgent and real confrontations).
61
But see Reichert, supra note 22, at 244-46 (arguing that a partnership
approach between developed country NGOs and developing country NGOs is
the best solution for achieving environmental goals in developing countries).
62 See Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU
NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectoriesof Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L
L. 231, 232 (1997) (advancing that "wealthy states with relatively stringent enviPublished by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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presence in Geneva is diminishing as modern information technologies allow groups throughout the world to monitor and contribute to WTO debates.6 3 It is important to remember that
much of the participation of NGOs in the WTO will be as observers rather64 than as lobbyists, making fears of NGO distortion
inapplicable.
Those who oppose NGO participation in the WTO fear that
the organization will be overwhelmed on a practical level. What
if, the critics ask, hundreds of NGOs descend on the modest
WTO headquarters?65 Again, this fear seems exaggerated. The
number of NGOs that are tracking trade and environment issues
is quite limited. Even if all of them arrived in Geneva, they could
be accommodated in a small observers section at any meeting.
Furthermore, NGOs have been included in international decision-making processes with no ill effect.66
6. DELINEATING NGO ROLES

The benefits of NGO participation in and the risks of special
interest manipulation of the international trading system vary depending upon the particular WTO activity. In defining appropriate roles for NGOs at the WTO, it is worth examining separately
the multiple places within the international trading system in
which environmental groups and others might participate.
6.1.

Dispute Resolution

Allowing NGOs to observe dispute resolution proceedings
would reduce the mystery surrounding the WTO and the international trading system. If environmental groups were to understand how the WTO made these quasi-judicial decisions, they
ronmental" standards drive the trade-environment agenda); but see Gordenker
& Weiss, supra note 60, at 25 (explaining how technological advances have expanded global communities beyond mere geographic borders).
63 See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 142.
64 For a description of how NGOs might participate, see id. at 14347.
65 For a discussion of practical concerns raised, see id. at 14243.
66 Many UN conferences such as the 1994 Cairo Population Conference,
the 1995 Beijing Woman's Conference, and the 1996 Copenhagen Conference
on Human Habitats have involved non-governmental organizations. See id. at
143 n.85; see also Chiara Giorgetti, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations
in the Climate Change Negotiations, 9 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL L. & POL'Y 115,
126-36 (1998) (discussing the role of NGOs in the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change).
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would have less criticism about national sovereignty being overridden by 'faceless international bureaucrats' in Geneva.67 For instance, the U.S. courts have well-established procedures for amicus
curiae filings that do not disrupt, and by most accounts actually
enhance, judicial decision-making. Within the WTO, this type of
contribution would add to the diversity of views available to
68 the
decision-makers and thus to the legitimacy of their decisions.
The key to avoiding manipulation of dispute panels lies not in
keeping NGOs out of the meetings, but rather in establishing a
clear bar on ex parte contacts with the panel members or WTO
staff handling a particular dispute. 69 The risk of distortion comes
not from "on the record" meetings but from behind-the-scenes
lobbying and cajoling of dispute resolution panel members. Thus,
the key to avoiding special interest distortion of WTO dispute
resolution lies in formalizing WTO dispute settlement procedures. The trading system might be made more transparent, systematic, consistent, and fair by dispelling the myth that dispute
resolution proceedings are negotiations and by making the process
more judicial by including a structured opportunity for NGO observation and submissions. What goes on in "open court" is almost never a problem. Official filings placed on a public docket,
for all to rebut if they see fit, will hardly corrupt the WTO's decision-making process, but rather may serve to sharpen its debates.
6.2.

LegislativeMode

Keeping NGOs out of the WTO General Council meetings or
the sessions of the Committee on Trade and Environment serves
little purpose. Again, there is considerable benefit to be had by
allowing non-governmental organizations to observe these proceedings: Developing public understanding of the workings of
the international trading system, bringing a diversity of opinions
and greater expertise to bear on WTO decisions, and increasing
the legitimacy of WTO decision-making are all potential benefits.7 0 The presence of NGOs in public sessions poses little danger
of causing manipulated WTO "legislative" decisions. The real

67 Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 128.

61 See id. at 144-45 (describing the role NGOs could play in broadening information available to the WTO).
69 See id. at 145.
70 See id. at 14546.
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risk of manipulation exists not during open debate but rather during private meetings that occur outside these public discussions.
Excluding NGOs from the formal sessions does little to prevent
these "behind-closed-doors" influences. 7 ' Again, the answer to
fears of public interest manipulation lies in establishing more
formal WTO administrative rules and procedures. WTO staff
should be required to disclose the sources of information that
they rely upon when making decisions. It would be helpful,
moreover, to adopt general disclosure requirements for all WTO
staff and perhaps national representatives in Geneva such as indicating the special interest groups with whom the official has had
contact. In addition, a log of meetings, meals, trips, or any other
inducement provided by special interest groups should be disclosed.
Fundamentally, as the WTO's role in global governance expands (as it inevitably must), the public has a right to expect that
the organization will operate so as to provide some guarantee of
the integrity and legitimacy in its choices. This almost certainly
entails a commitment to create a body of administrative rules and
procedures and to adhere to principles of administrative law. In
fact, the most important "linkage" that the WTO needs might
well be to the field of administrative law. Operating within a
formal structure, NGOs can serve as watchdogs over the processes of global governance while posing little risk of endangering
the system.
6.3.

Trade Negotiations

To the extent that the WTO serves as a forum for multilateral
trade negotiations, the argument for exclusion of NGOs has
greater merit. Trade negotiations represent a form of diplomatic
transaction that benefits from a degree of secrecy.72 Often, it is
easier to bargain if those who stand to lose are not privy to the
negotiations. Nevertheless, some negotiation sessions, particularly those which involve formal speeches, could be opened to
NGOs at little risk.7 3 Many recent international environmental
71

Cf Nichols, Realism, supra note 22, at 860 (suggesting that NGOs serve
as a "buffer between decision-makers and special interest groups" when appearing before dispute panels).
72 See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 146.
73 The U.S. Trade Act of 1974 provides an example of consultation mechanisms in trade policy. See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Customs Duties and Import Regulahttps://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss3/1
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negotiations have included NGO observers at formal sessions
without ill effect.7 4 Again, having NGOs available to transmit information back to their members could provide real value as a
mode of outreach and help to establish the credibility, openness,
and legitimacy of the WTO as an institution.7' And, when necessary, government officials could still meet behind closed doors to
make the deals required to produce trade agreements.
7. CONCLUSION

The World Trade Organization has a critical role to play in
international economic management. A more open WTO decision-making process that includes non-governmental entities, operating both as intellectual competitors to and support mechanisms for governments, offers the promise of strengthening the
international trading system, thereby enhancing the WTO's legitimacy, authority, and effectiveness. More transparent decisionmaking processes within the international trading system would
widen the information available to the WTO when making "trade
and" decisions and would thereby improve its capacity to provide
the right answer.
Improved decision-making, greater authority, and enhanced
legitimacy would all help the WTO to quell the fear of
"globalization" growing around the world. We cannot avoid having some decision-making processes shift, at least in part to the
global scale, and we cannot survive without the WTO playing a
role in international economic governance. But, we must find
ways to diminish the threat that this broadened WTO role poses
to our tradition of democracy and to our sense of representativeness and fairness. Part of the answer lies in improved WTO
mechanisms and procedures-refining the existing system by reference to the learning that is available in the fields of welfare economics, public choice theory, federalism, and administrative law,
tions S 20 (1981); see also Jonathan I. Miller, Comment, Prospectsfor Satisfactory
Dispute Resolution of Private Commercial Disputes Under ihe North American
Free Trade Agreement, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1313, 1319 n.33 (1994) (discussing private sector consultations during NAFTA negotiations).
74 See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention
on
Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L. L. 451, 534 (1993)

(describing how the Climate Change Convention allows for NGO observers at
the Conference of the Parties); see generally RICHARD N. GARDNER, NEGOTIATING SURVIVAL: FOUR PRIORITIES AFTER RIO (1992).

75 See Esty, NGOs, supra note 1, at 126-28, 134-35.
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among other disciplines. These linkages offer the promise of
more sophisticated international scale governance, a more analytically rigorous trade policy-making process, and a greater capacity
to optimize outcomes across multiple goals, such as trade liberalization and environmental protection.
NGOs can also help to ensure that the public both feels connected to and actually is connected to these more distantly made
decisions. And, while the risk of protectionist capture of the
WTO by environmental groups and other NGOs is not imaginary, lobbying disclosure rules better address any prospect of special interest manipulation of WTO decision-making processes
than exclusion of NGOs from the activities of the international
trading system.
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